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Introduction
Markets for health care services are much more complex than mar-
kets in other highly regulated industries, such as public utilities, due to
asymmetric information. Unlike most publicly regulated goods and
services, consumers often do not know, and can not ascertain them-
selves, the quality of health care service, and may not even be able to
observe whether a suggested treatment quality was actually provided
or not. “Credence goods” are goods and services whose quality is bet-
ter understood by an expert  than the consumer himself (Darby and
Karni, 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). Depending on market
and institutional settings, information problems in the provision of
health care services could lead either to undertreatment or to
overtreatment and overcharging.
Traditionally, the provision of services has been mainly a domestic
activity, while the pharmaceutical industry has been highly interna-
tionalized. However, technological change, trade liberalization and
patient mobility are progressively opening up service markets to for-
eign competition. Thus, offshoring and trade of professional health
services has been recognized to be a prominent example of a new type
of trade (Bhagwati et al., 2004; Mankiw et al. 2004; Markusen, 2005;
Amiti and Wei, 2005). Medical services such as teleradiology (Levy
and Yu, 2006) and arthroscopy (Baldwin 2006) are often cited as para-
digm examples of how globalization might threaten highly educated
workers both in Europe and the U.S.
Meanwhile, increasing consolidation of insurers, providers, and the
health industry, including pharmaceutical companies, device manufac-
Chapter 4
turers, and other suppliers of health services, is transforming national
health care markets. The reduction of information asymmetries and
patients’ switching costs is affecting productivity and is modifying the
sources of market power in health care.
Above all, health care is an innovation based, R&D intensive sector.
Technical change is embedded in both goods, such as drugs and med-
ical devices, and health care services, with important consequences in
terms of static and dynamic efficiency conditions (see Ahn, 2002).
Thus, markets for health care services have to provide incentives for
both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing technological change. In
other terms, the allocation of resources devoted to R&D and the
direction of technical change are influenced by the way in which
health care is financed.
The demand for health care is a function of the state of technology,
and hence of previous R&D undertakings (Weisbrod, 1991). Histori-
cally, public coverage and insurance have sustained the development of
quality-improving technologies. In his work in 1992, Newhouse states
that almost three-fourths of the increase of health care spending in the
last century is attributable to technological change. Jones (2002) finds
that technological progress may have accounted for as much as half of
total spending growth over recent decades throughout the OECD.
Finally, the health care sector is heavily regulated. In the past, regu-
lation was designed to guarantee safety, efficacy, and quality and,
moreover, to deal with potential market failures and need for complex
chains of principal agent relations — patient-physician, physician-
payer, payer-society — to deal with market and administrative ineffi-
ciencies associated with credence goods.
Regulation is not only meant to guarantee and improve access to
better health services, but also to control health care expenditure, both
on the supply side (tariffs, price controls), and on the demand side (co-
payment schemes, formularies, contract design).
Historically, health policy has been under the responsibility of
national state authorities. In almost all EU Member States health care
is tax funded: healthy young workers pay for the care of sick, usually
older citizens. Moreover, European countries have opted for different
financial frameworks and regulation schemes to control health care
costs, for both pharmaceutical products and hospitals.
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Such a fragmentation of the European institutional and regulatory
framework is preventing both the European Union and Member States
from taking an active and positive role in balancing and aligning differ-
ent interests through managed competition (see Abbott, 1995).
The current equilibrium is neither efficient nor sustainable. The
total level of health spending and its allocation among different serv-
ices and products tend to perpetuate national historic patterns of care
and consumption, instead of responding to the interest of European
patients in opening up health care markets to trade and dynamic com-
petition. At the same time, universal tax funded systems and strict
public regulation of health care markets in many Member States pre-
vent the rise of a pluralistic system in which public coverage coexists
with a complementary private insurance sector. In the past, young
generations relied on future generations to pay for their care. At pres-
ent, demographic changes — a falling birth rate and growing life
expectancy — are likely to cause severe funding problems within the
existing framework, which will worsen over the years.
Both in Europe and in the U.S. the key challenge for governments is
how to design pluralistic systems of health care delivery and financing, in
which multiple plans and market forces can act to promote competition.
Public and private programs can converge to make patterns of care
responsive to individual preferences balancing different incentives,
without imposing excessive financial burdens on individuals or deny-
ing necessary care because of inability to pay (see Feldstein, 1995).
In this context, public authorities should design fine-tuned regula-
tory policies in health care markets, stimulating innovation and
dynamic competition and, at the same time, dealing with market
imperfections and asymmetric information.
Against this background, this chapter focuses on some of the exist-
ing barriers to market integration and trade liberalization in health
care. Institutional fragmentation in the regulation of health care mar-
kets tends to be remarkably high, since both health provision and
financing are considered as key components of fiscal and redistributive
policies by individual States.
There is growing demand for reducing administrative barriers to
market integration in Europe. In 2005 the European Parliament, in its
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“Report on Patient Mobility and Healthcare Developments in the
EU,” called for the Commission to act on a wide range of issues
related to patient mobility and cooperation among national health sys-
tems, starting for harmonization of health payment schemes across
member states. Coordination among European countries to deal with
patient mobility starts to be perceived as a priority by an increasing
number of European Countries and citizens, since intra-EU mobility
has been increasing dramatically as a consequence of progresses in the
EU labor market enlargement and integration. Such harmonization
can be achieved only by reducing transaction costs and regulatory bar-
riers and promoting a pluralistic system in health financing, with
international private actors complementing the role of the public and
contributing to both cross border mobility of patients and to a better
integration of health services markets across the Atlantic.
The Institutional Context of Health Care Services
in Europe
The regulatory framework governing cross border provision of
health services within the European Union has become more and more
complex over the last decade. Cross-border provision of services (such
as remote diagnosis and prescription and laboratory services), and the
use of services abroad are covered by Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71,
now replaced by Articles 19-20 of Regulation 883/2004, under the pri-
mary purpose of granting social security coordination across member
states. Permanent as well as temporary presence of providers in host
countries is admitted under Directive 36/05, which regulates the
recognition of professional qualifications. Thanks to better transporta-
tion and communications and lower cross-border restrictions, patient
mobility is becoming the easiest way to benefit from cross-border pro-
vision of health care. At the same time, it calls for coordination among
Member States’ health care and funding systems.
In hospital markets, different schemes have been introduced both
in the U.S. and in European countries to pursue allocative efficiency
among providers. Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and prospective
payment schemes have replaced cost-plus reimbursement schemes,
stimulating efficiency in the use of inputs and competition among
providers. Price regulation via “prospective-payment” insurance
schemes can induce competition and mobility, provided that hospitals
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compete for contracts with multiple institutional health purchasers.
Providers are forced to compete reducing inefficiencies and “differen-
tiating” their own services through specialization, instead of perform-
ing cost-shifting among patients (Anderson et al. 1993; Wallack et al.
1996).
Discussions on how to promote access to health care and hospital
services in the Single European Market started in 1998, following a
series of case law judgments by the European Court of Justice. Until
then, the Community mechanism enabling patients to receive treat-
ment abroad was designed by Regulation 1408/71. Urgent medical
treatments were provided to EU citizens temporarily visiting a Mem-
ber State according to the recipient statutory scheme, applying the
reimbursement conditions and tariffs of the hosting country. Financial
compensations between Member States were cleared either by com-
puting current costs or on a flat rate basis.
According to the Community legislation, patients needed prior
authorization from their competent institution in order to be reim-
bursed by their home country. In some cases national discretion has
been limited as authorization has to be released whenever health
treatments can be covered at home but with undue time delay.
This legal framework still remains in place, but in 1998, through
the Koll and Decker rulings, the European Court of Justice established
new principles on the reimbursement of health services provided to
patients abroad. When health services are provided for remuneration,
the fundamental principle of free movement of goods and services, set
out in Articles 30 and 49-50 of the EC Treaty, must apply.
An important element of modernization has been introduced by
Regulation 883/2004, with the European Health Insurance Card
(EHIC), designed to assure direct provision of occasional and “neces-
sary” health treatment in any EU country.
Moreover, the Court ruled that for non-hospital services patients
may move in any other Member State without requiring prior author-
ization, and be reimbursed according to the rules of their home health
system. However, in case of hospital services, state authorization is still
required, subject to the condition that the home health care system
cannot provide medical care within a reasonable limit of time.
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In general, legal uncertainty still affects cross border health care
provision in Europe. Available case studies1 highlight that procedures
under the EHIC scheme do not work efficiently; sometimes patients
do not receive direct health care treatments and are forced to out of
pocket payments. Furthermore, stringent national authorization poli-
cies for planned care have been undue obstacles of cross border provi-
sions, limiting the choices of patients and the opportunities offered by
the Single Market.
Information asymmetries can harm the negotiating process
between health care purchasers and providers. In particular, when the
quality of a service cannot be clearly identified ex-ante (i.e. before
service delivery), a problem of incomplete markets arises. Incomplete
contracts, in turn, increase the likelihood that further reductions in
costs are made at the expense of quality (quality-shading hypothesis,
Domberger and Jensen 1997).
As stated by the European Commission (2006) “a key concern
about the application of internal market rules is clarity over which
Member States’ authority is responsible for supervising health services
for each of the different kinds of health service. … For example, which
authority is responsible for ensuring the quality and safety of health
services provided to people from other Member States, whose com-
plaints and how patients will be compensated when they suffer harm,
and if there are errors, whose liability rules apply and how those errors
will be followed up?”
Another important issue related to contracting in an international
context is continuity of care. As a result, contracting with foreign
providers should include arrangements for follow-up assessment and
exchange of medical records and practices.
To deal with these issues, the European Parliament and the Council
invited the Commission to develop specific proposals by the end of
2007.
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1 See M. Rosenmoller, M. McKee and R. Baeten (2006), Patient mobility in the European
Union — Learning from Experience.
Fragmentation and Convergence in Pharmaceuticals
Control on public expenditure in pharmaceuticals has been pursued
in most European countries mainly through price regulation schemes
(price cap regulation, reference pricing, price volume agreements,
price negotiations, cost effectiveness criteria, ex post price cuts). Tradi-
tional approaches to price regulation combined with the fragmenta-
tion of the regulatory framework have induced a bias toward static
versus dynamic efficiency, thus reducing the price premium and mar-
ket incentives for new innovative drugs vis-à-vis the U.S. market.
Since R&D activities in pharmaceuticals are more and more con-
centrated in the U.S. (see Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2007; European
Commission, 2006), the current international division of labor does
not appear to be sustainable, and a coordination effort between
Europe and the U.S. has to be undertaken.
The pharmaceutical industry accounts for a large fraction of both
private and public health expenditure. Kyle (2006) reports that the
share of pharmaceuticals in total health care ranges from four percent
in the U.S. to around 18 percent in France and Italy, while, according
to OECD (2006), total health care expenditure as percentage of GDP
is above 15 percent in the U.S., while for France and Germany it is
higher than 10 percent.2
European markets are highly regulated, heterogeneous and frag-
mented. In France, Belgium and Spain cost-sharing is a proportion of
the price of drugs. In the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, co-pay-
ment is determined on a flat rate basis. Similarly, exemption schemes
are highly differentiated: some countries such as Germany provide a
maximum co-payment level; others, such as the UK, exempt the poor
and elderly; and still other Member States specify particular categories
of “essential drugs” for which there is no charge (Italy and France).
Other measures tend to influence physicians’ prescription behavior
through positive lists of reimbursable drugs or negative lists of non-
reimbursable pharmaceuticals, clinical guidelines and financial incen-
tives. Moreover, pharmacists sometimes have generic substitution
rights if doctors have not formally opposed substitution of the
branded products.
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2 For the U.S. and France the reference year is 2004, while for Germany it is 2003.
In this context, price convergence across national pharmaceutical
markets has been driven by cross country reference pricing schemes
and parallel trade rather than by regulatory integration and free mar-
ket competition (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1  Price convergence in EU25, median prices, 1994-2004
(EU-15 average price = 1).
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
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So far, efforts aimed at developing a Single Market for pharmaceuti-
cals have failed. Excess fragmentation of pricing and reimbursement
schemes, as well as cost containment policies in Europe, had a negative
effect on both incentives to innovate and the introduction of new drugs.
Although there has been a gradual move towards harmonization of
regulatory standards on market authorization (Mutual Recognition
and Centralized Procedures), pharmaceutical companies still must
negotiate with individual countries on price and reimbursement.
Cross-country differences in price regulation schemes imply an exces-
sive market fragmentation and, moreover, tend to delay the launch of
innovative products.
Table 4.1 shows market concentration and relative prices of the first
three products in each anatomic therapeutic class of pharmaceuticals
(ATC4). Concentration is measured by the concentration ratio of the
first n firms/products C n (n = 1,…,10) in the market. The one-firm/
product concentration ratio C 1 corresponds to the market share of the
largest firm/product, while the C n index equal the sum of the market
shares of the top n firms/products in terms of sales. Market concentra-
tion of the first product in nominal values can be broken down into
two components: the concentration in real values — i.e. the number of
standard units sold — multiplied by its relative price (the price of the
first product divided by the mean price in the market).
Table 4.1 shows that the U.S. market is less fragmented than the
EU market as a whole and all the most important national markets in
Europe (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), with the exception of the
UK. On average, the three leading products in each of the top one
hundred therapeutic categories account for 85.6 percent of total mar-
ket share in the U.S., as compared with a total market share of 77.3
percent in the EU-25.
The gap between the U.S. and the EU is wide in terms of sales,
while the U.S. market is as concentrated as the European one in terms
of volume. Thus the higher concentration of the U.S. market is due to
the “premium price” that leading products can command. Indeed, the
relative price of the market leader in the U.S. is 44 percent higher
than the market average price (see Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2006).
The analysis of market shares of the leading companies confirms
this view (Table 4.2).
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Table 4.1  Average market concentration (sales and volumes)
and relative prices of the first three products on the
market, top 100 ATC4 classes, 1994-2004
C1(S) C1(Q) P1 C2(S) C2(Q) P2 C3(S) C3(Q) P3
EU-25 41.72 34.70 1.20 64.61 56.95 1.13 77.31 71.47 1.08
EU-15 41.18 34.17 1.21 63.83 56.05 1.14 76.53 70.49 1.09
U.S. 49.72 34.63 1.44 74.96 59.48 1.26 85.56 70.74 1.21
Germany 29.97 22.94 1.31 47.42 38.49 1.23 58.87 50.95 1.16
Italy 36.68 33.49 1.10 57.57 54.07 1.06 71.49 67.14 1.06
France 39.01 31.21 1.25 64.88 54.45 1.19 78.18 71.16 1.10
Spain 40.36 32.62 1.24 62.37 52.72 1.18 75.94 67.92 1.12
Czech Rep. 46.26 40.80 1.13 72.70 66.68 1.09 86.77 83.83 1.04
Portugal 46.73 39.65 1.18 70.41 61.34 1.15 84.32 79.63 1.06
Belgium 48.33 42.24 1.14 76.64 70.27 1.09 92.24 86.65 1.06
Austria 48.43 41.12 1.18 74.19 66.51 1.12 87.70 82.03 1.07
Netherlands 48.56 37.60 1.29 72.35 58.42 1.24 86.24 76.38 1.13
Luxembourg 49.54 39.93 1.24 76.49 68.20 1.12 89.91 83.20 1.08
Slovak Rep. 50.02 42.52 1.18 76.77 72.70 1.06 90.69 90.27 1.00
Poland 50.16 39.71 1.26 76.55 68.63 1.12 89.29 85.30 1.05
Ireland 51.19 43.77 1.17 77.50 72.42 1.07 91.76 87.10 1.05
Latvia 45.07 35.23 1.28 68.63 63.24 1.09 82.96 79.67 1.04
Lithuania 51.53 44.06 1.17 77.37 72.95 1.06 90.67 88.95 1.02
Finland 52.30 45.58 1.15 78.95 73.26 1.08 92.65 89.54 1.03
Greece 52.73 43.08 1.22 78.00 69.76 1.12 88.90 83.08 1.07
Denmark 53.50 45.22 1.18 80.34 75.33 1.07 93.07 91.05 1.02
Sweden 53.68 44.70 1.20 79.70 75.51 1.06 91.60 89.95 1.02
Estonia 54.71 45.13 1.21 80.74 75.51 1.07 93.32 91.67 1.02
Hungary 54.85 52.29 1.05 84.04 82.19 1.02 96.11 95.72 1.00
UK 55.69 48.34 1.15 79.61 75.16 1.06 90.20 87.75 1.03
Slovenia 61.25 54.13 1.13 88.25 84.98 1.04 97.89 97.47 1.00
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
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Table 4.2  Market shares of the leading company (C1) and top
three companies (C3) and firm turnover, sales and
volumes, 2004
C1 C3 Turnover*
Country Sales Quantity Sales Quantity Sales Quantity
EU-15 9.59 8.43 25.00 21.11 5.77 5.23
EU-25 9.40 8.29 24.78 21.24 5.76 5.04
U.S. 15.14 9.33 31.06 20.12 9.48 10.55
Italy 10.20 7.33 23.85 19.22 5.46 4.91
Belgium 12.31 8.02 29.14 21.16 5.71 5.42
Spain 9.84 6.34 21.96 16.70 6.17 5.24
France 16.95 14.77 30.92 29.94 6.22 5.69
Portugal 8.43 7.80 23.93 19.10 6.83 5.32
Germany 7.60 12.20 19.88 26.77 7.23 6.92
Finland 11.79 23.94 31.14 38.60 7.25 4.91
Ireland 14.88 15.61 33.45 30.95 7.41 6.45
Luxembourg 12.35 7.17 32.03 21.16 7.56 6.07
Austria 7.95 10.18 23.03 23.74 7.80 5.74
Greece 10.63 13.49 28.00 29.06 8.34 8.31
Sweden 14.52 21.87 32.96 43.88 8.84 7.16
UK 15.72 19.56 35.73 35.83 9.16 5.22
Hungary 9.86 19.34 28.96 38.38 9.84 7.68
Netherlands 10.72 15.55 27.37 33.42 10.05 8.70
Denmark 9.96 34.72 26.48 55.36 10.23 17.86
Slovenia 17.93 21.10 40.54 47.41 10.96 9.53
Poland 7.62 12.33 21.72 29.59 11.42 8.97
Czech Rep. 14.30 26.03 27.64 36.79 12.26 9.56
Estonia 9.33 7.04 24.36 19.36 13.94 16.72
Slovak Rep. 10.97 22.44 25.83 38.70 14.78 11.68
Lithuania 7.73 7.00 21.60 18.35 21.23 19.05
Latvia 7.58 6.20 19.39 16.83 21.98 22.89
*computed as in Hymer, Pashigian, 1962.
Source: our computations on IMS Health, Copyright 2005.
Interestingly enough, higher concentration levels in the U.S. mar-
ket do not imply less competition. Figure 4.2 shows the product
mobility index for each therapeutic market (ATC4 class), defined as
the sum of the annual change in the product market share (Hymer,
Pashigian, 1962). Boxplots highlight the median value of the index and
the 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution. The most striking
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Figure 4.2  Product mobility statistics over all ATC4 therapeutic
markets*
Turnover (sales) Turnover (quantities)
*The product mobility index is computed as in Hymer, Pashigian (1962).
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
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Table 4.3  The persistence of the leading product in top 100
ATC4 markets
Leadership change (%)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 AP
Portugal 6.42 6.36 7.62 9.26 7.74 4.95 5.86 9.88 8.72 9.06 13.18
Spain 6.50 9.97 7.20 10.37 7.33 9.74 7.95 6.98 8.55 8.53 12.03
Italy 7.40 9.72 8.14 9.14 7.79 7.01 9.84 7.51 9.66 7.41 11.96
Sweden 4.99 10.69 9.62 7.93 10.56 8.62 7.43 10.70 9.30 8.66 11.30
UK 10.46 8.92 8.00 8.71 10.16 8.38 9.11 9.50 8.16 7.24 11.28
Ireland 11.39 10.00 11.39 9.17 9.01 6.61 8.16 10.91 11.82 7.42 10.43
Belgium 8.36 7.24 7.56 9.58 9.78 11.36 9.86 10.31 11.52 11.08 10.35
Finland 7.76 9.67 9.85 9.79 10.88 9.50 7.19 11.24 11.31 12.06 10.08
Austria 7.32 9.38 10.09 11.31 8.92 10.54 13.84 9.53 11.78 9.82 9.75
EU-15 10.70 10.94 9.84 10.71 10.15 9.34 10.23 10.25 10.81 10.16 9.70
EU-25 10.95 11.14 10.05 10.97 10.43 9.52 10.30 10.36 10.89 10.40 9.52
France 9.30 10.57 9.82 12.01 10.42 10.28 10.00 11.00 12.76 11.28 9.31
Luxembourg 12.30 10.71 13.44 11.08 11.05 9.89 8.11 10.33 10.11 10.63 9.29
Hungary 14.46 14.98 13.67 12.67 10.67 9.86 5.26 9.73 7.07 10.93 9.15
Netherlands 9.61 10.59 11.54 10.18 14.24 10.85 11.08 10.39 9.04 12.28 9.11
Denmark 12.33 13.38 11.18 12.54 13.61 9.81 8.97 10.03 13.03 9.90 8.71
Greece 7.63 10.38 11.72 14.97 9.54 12.53 11.66 11.65 14.83 12.63 8.51
Germany 16.49 14.16 12.66 11.94 12.14 10.02 12.96 13.12 12.12 12.94 7.78
Slovenia 16.17 14.99 13.91 14.08 15.67 11.94 12.81 8.72 9.89 14.67 7.53
Poland 17.47 12.66 15.22 14.95 17.45 12.76 11.26 13.54 13.25 16.02 6.92
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 11.59 11.55 16.52 19.46 16.77 13.69 6.40
Czech Rep. 18.37 18.55 15.27 15.74 18.58 15.82 13.56 11.65 16.58 13.42 6.35
U.S. 17.20 17.12 17.35 19.67 18.59 15.65 15.85 17.48 16.40 14.87 5.88
Slovak Rep. 22.22 21.35 18.86 26.32 21.28 14.74 13.76 13.31 14.66 18.70 5.40
Lithuania 0.00 73.10 28.03 25.23 22.09 19.51 28.19 16.57 17.83 19.29 4.00
Latvia 83.16 25.08 23.49 24.14 18.36 24.65 20.17 24.23 15.45 18.85 3.60
AP = Average Persistency.
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
result is that firm turnover in the U.S. is almost double that of the
EU-15 and EU-25.
The lower turnover of EU markets means higher persistency and
lower market contestability. As an average, the persistency of the lead-
ing product in the U.S. is slightly less than six years, while in the EU it
is almost 10 years (Table 4.3).
U.S. product turnover is more intense than in Europe (Table 4.4).
Product exit rate and turnover are almost double in the U.S. than in
the EU-15 (8.3 and 4.5 percent, 22.3 and 14.8 percent respectively).
Product entry rates are more than 3 percentage points higher in the
U.S. than in the EU-15. All in all, the process of creative destruction
seems to be much less intense in the European markets than in the
U.S., where new and improved products displace old ones in any given
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Table 4.4  Product turnover as a share of existing products (top
100 ATC4 classes, 1995-2004)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avg.
Product entry rate (%)
U.S. 12.15 16.64 18.81 15.30 15.45 9.05 14.13 n.a. 11.00 12.29 13.87
EU-15 9.12 9.53 9.15 11.78 11.07 10.62 9.41 9.98 10.28 10.71 10.17
EU-25 9.30 9.54 9.33 11.91 11.11 10.67 9.46 10.00 10.31 10.65 10.23
Product exit rate (%)
U.S. 13.39 7.51 7.44 6.25 8.38 13.43 6.87 7.61 6.09 6.37 8.33
EU-15 n.a. 4.92 4.51 4.29 4.60 4.03 3.87 4.04 4.66 5.39 4.48
EU-25 n.a. 4.92 4.57 4.38 4.64 4.15 4.11 4.17 4.68 n.a. 4.45
Product turnover (%)
U.S. 25.54 24.14 26.25 21.55 23.84 22.47 21.00 n.a. 17.10 18.66 22.28
EU-15 n.a. 14.44 13.66 16.07 15.67 14.65 13.28 14.02 14.94 16.10 14.76
EU-25 n.a. 14.46 13.91 16.29 15.76 14.82 13.57 14.17 15.00 n.a. 14.75
Product net entry (%)
U.S. -1.24 9.13 11.37 9.05 7.07 -4.38 7.26 n.a. 4.91 5.92 5.45
EU-15 n.a. 4.61 4.64 7.49 6.47 6.59 5.54 5.94 5.62 5.32 5.80
EU-25 n.a. 4.62 4.76 7.53 6.47 6.52 5.35 5.83 5.63 n.a. 5.84
Reported n.a. correspond to computed entry and exit rates outside the range of average turnover
+/– two times the standard deviation interval, computed on the basis of observed product entry
and exit rates.
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
therapeutic market. Low market contestability in Europe is one of the
most striking consequences of market fragmentation and price regula-
tion that undermines the productivity of European companies, since
national barriers still limit, to a certain extent, the breadth of the mar-
ket segment within which they can draw customers away from rivals.
Moreover, differences in price levels, as well as in reimbursement
and co-payment schemes across countries, account for the delay in the
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Figure 4.3  Introduction lag (in months) from launch on the U.S.
market of all molecules launched since 1975
Source: our computations on IMS Health.
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(Danzon et al., 2003; Gabrowski and Wang, 2006; Kyle, 2006).
Figure 4.3 shows that, with the exception of the Netherlands, Euro-
pean countries experience a time lag in the launch of new molecules.
The median delay from the U.S. launch is eight months for EU-15,3
which increases to 17 months for the EU-25.
In conclusion, EU health care markets are more fragmented and
less dynamic vis-à-vis the U.S. due to regulatory barriers, which pre-
vent market integration, competitive turnover, contestability, and
dynamic competition. As a result, since patient, product and firm
mobility are limited, price differences among countries persist to favor
parallel trade and hinder product innovation.
Conclusions
Heterogeneous national regulatory frameworks, price regulation
mechanisms and cost containment policies in Europe have a negative
impact on market integration as well as on productivity and innova-
tion in health care markets for goods and services.
The key challenge for EU governments is to design and coordinate
pluralistic systems of health care delivery and financing, in which mar-
ket forces and mechanisms of managed competition can act to gener-
ate an environment favorable to investment and innovation, while
public and private programs can perform complementary functions to
make patterns of care responsive to individual preferences without
imposing excessive financial burdens on individuals or denying neces-
sary care because of inability to pay.
The uneven geographical distribution of research efforts in phar-
maceuticals, together with the differences in price levels for innovative
drugs between Europe and the U.S., calls for revival of a transatlantic
dialogue on the political economy of pharmaceuticals and medical
technologies, through the lens of trade policy and protection of intel-
lectual property rights.
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3 When considering the European aggregate, the comparison is made between the median
launch across the European countries and the launch in the U.S.
Moreover, for Europe and the U.S. both productivity and the rate
and direction of medical innovation will be affected by the interplay
between technological advances and patterns of demand, especially in
relation to the effective management of health and pharmaceutical
expenditures to encourage innovation while preserving access and fis-
cal sustainability.
In the health care sector, Europe is suffering at the supranational
level from the sort of institutional fragmentation that hindered trans-
actions and stifled economic growth for centuries within European
states themselves. In each country, the power of the state to set health
and pharmaceutical policy is intertwined with political autonomy.
Fearful of yielding power to the EU Commission, individual nations
have private incentives to resist common reforms, regardless of the
negative effects on productivity, mobility, specialization, and trade.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, problems of institutional frag-
mentation within European states were solved through the establish-
ment of uniform national laws by central governments (see Dincecco,
2006). Standardization of domestic systems of weights and measures
in the 19th century provides a useful illustration of centralization
efforts. Beforehand, spatial fragmentation of weights and measures
across towns and provinces raised the costs of commerce, hindering
competition, specialization, and trade. With the implementation of
nation-wide decimal systems, transactions costs between locales were
significantly reduced, stimulating economic growth.
This is not to suggest that what Europe need is greater government
involvement in the regulation of health care markets. The market
forces that ultimately drive innovation and efficiency, rather than the
visible hand of the government, should be encouraged and coordi-
nated. In parallel, the EU Commission should have greater control
over the underlying “rules of the game,” establishing the legal frame-
work that sustain market integration and patient mobility.
At this final juncture, a caveat deserves mention. A distinction
between the interests of the EU as a whole and those of individual
states must be made. The establishment by the EU Commission of a
uniform set of rules governing health care and pharmaceutical mar-
kets in Europe would reduce transactions costs and promote efficiency
through competition and market integration. In the long run, Europe
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would benefit as a whole of the standardization of such rules, while
rents accruing to individual countries and actors that had profited
from the previous set of idiosyncratic institutional arrangement would
be lost irrevocably. Hence, it is not surprising that states would resist
institutional reforms with positive effects at the EU level if they were
perceived to threaten traditional privileges (and associated revenue
streams) at the national level.
It is precisely in this sort of situation, where the incentives of indi-
vidual players diverge from the common interest, that a single central-
izing authority such as the EU Commission should be granted the
power to design an institutional framework that aligns the different
sets of incentives of single member States.
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